This paper presents and analyzes a novel concatenated coding scheme for enabling error resilience in two distributed storage settings: one being storage using existing regenerating codes and the second being storage using locally repairable codes. The concatenated coding scheme brings together a maximum rank distance code as an outer code and either a globally regenerating or a locally repairable code as an inner code. In addition, error resilience for combination of locally repairable codes with regenerating codes is considered. This concatenated coding system is designed to handle two different types of adversarial errors: the first type includes an adversary that can replace the content of an affected node only once; while the second type studies an adversary that is capable of polluting data an unbounded number of times. The paper establishes an upper bound on the resilience capacity for a locally repairable code. This paper also proves that the proposed concatenated coding approach attains the upper bound on the resilience capacity in the presence of the first type of adversary for both minimum storage regenerating codes and locally repairable codes. Further, this paper presents mechanisms that combine the presented concatenated coding scheme with subspace signatures to achieve error resilience for the second type of errors. 1 We note that another adversary model where an adversary has limited eavesdropping capability, i.e., can observe only a limited number of nodes, also was considered in [26] . However, in this work we only focuss on the omniscient adversary model. A computationally bounded adversary model was considered for example in [5] . We also work with a computationally bounded adversary which has full knowledge of the coding scheme and can observe all nodes in Section V. We refer to this adversary model as a computationally bounded omniscient adversary.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background D ISTRIBUTED storage systems (DSS) have gained importance over recent years as dependable, easily accessible and well administrated cloud resource for both individuals and businesses. There are multiple research issues that are unique to DSS; some of which are logistical and market driven, while others relate with their underlying design. A primary concern in designing DSS is to ensure resilience to failures, as it is desirable that a user (data collector) can retrieve the stored data even in the presence of node failures. As studied in the pioneering work by Dimakis et al. [6] , coding introduces redundancy to a storage system in an efficient manner to enable resilience to failures. In [6] , Dimakis et al. go one step further: when a single node fails, they propose reconstructing the data stored on the failed node in order to maintain the required level of redundancy in the system. This process of data reconstruction for a failed node is called the node repair process [6] . During a node repair process, the node which is added to the system to replace the failed node, downloads data from a set of surviving nodes to reconstruct the lost (or its equivalent) data.
Regenerating codes and locally repairable codes (LRCs) are two families of codes that are especially designed to allow for efficient node repairs in DSS. In particular, regenerating codes are designed to reduce repair bandwidth, i.e., the amount of data downloaded from surviving nodes during the node repair process. On the other hand, LRCs are designed to have a small number of nodes participating in the node repair process. The constructions for these two families of codes can be found in [3] , [6] , [7] , [10] , [12] , [14] - [17] , [23] - [25] , [27] , [28] , [30] , [31] , [33] , [35] , [36] , [40] - [42] , and references therein.
Although failure resilience is of critical importance as failure of storage nodes is commonplace in storage systems, there are multiple other design considerations that merit study in conjunction with failure resilience. These include security, error resilience, update efficiency and load balancing. In this paper, we address the issue of instilling error resilience in DSS, particularly against adversarial errors. In particular, we model and present coding methodologies that allow for a data collector to correctly decode data even in presence of adversarial errors.
B. Contributions and Organization
Following the work of Pawar et al. [26] , we consider the setting where DSS is under attack of an omniscient adversary who can observe all nodes and has full knowledge of the coding scheme employed by the system. As in [26] , we assume an upper bound on the number of nodes that can be controlled by such an omniscient adversary. 1 We classify adversarial attacks by such an adversary into two classes: 1) Static errors: an omniscient adversary replaces the content of an affected node with arbitrary (erroneous) information only once. The affected node uses this same polluted information during all subsequent repair and data collection processes. Static errors represent a common type of data corruption due to wear out of storage devices, such as latent disk errors or other physical defects of the storage media, where the data stored on a node is permanently distorted. 2) Dynamic errors: an omniscient adversary may replace the content of an affected node each time the node is asked for its data during data collection or repair process. This kind of errors captures wider set of malicious behaviour of an adversary, hence is more difficult to manage in comparison with static errors. As a main contribution of this paper, we propose novel coding schemes, based on rank-metric codes, which provide resilience against adversarial errors in both regenerating codes and LRCs based DSS. Moreover, we also consider error resilience in DSS employing combination of LRCs and regenerating codes [17] , [30] .
Before presenting our coding schemes, in Section III, we focus on obtaining the upper bounds on resilience capacity, i.e., the maximum amount of data that can be reliably stored on a coded DSS under the aforementioned adversarial attacks. In particular, we present a novel bound on the resilience capacity of DSS employing locally repairable codes in Section III-B. Here, we note that we restrict our analysis to only those minimum distance optimal LRCs that have disjoint local groups. We then present upper bounds on the resilience capacity of the codes with optimal bandwidth local regeneration in Section III-C. These codes utilize regenerating codes as local codes in each of the disjoint local groups and minimize the repair bandwidth for a given (small) locality. Here, we note that various bounds presented in Section III are applicable to both kinds of attacks involving static errors and dynamic errors. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work which considers the issue of error resilience for locally repairable codes and their combination with regenerating codes.
In Section IV, we present a novel approach to design coding schemes for DSS which provide resilience against attacks involving static errors. The proposed coding schemes allow for either optimal repair bandwidth or optimal local node repairs. The coding schemes for optimal repair bandwidth DSS are described in Section IV-A. In such schemes the content to be stored is first encoded using a maximum rank distance (MRD) code. The output of this outer code is further encoded using a regenerating code, which allows for bandwidth efficient node repairs having the minimum storage in each node, namely a minimum storage regenerating (MSR) code. Using an MRD code, which is an optimal rank-metric code, allows us to quantify the errors introduced in the system using their rank as opposed to their Hamming weights. The dynamic nature of the DSS causes a large number of nodes to get polluted even by a single erroneous node, as false information spreads from node repairs. Thus, a single polluted node infects many others, resulting in an error vector with a large Hamming weight. Using rank-metric codes can help alleviate this problem as the error that a data collector has to handle has a known rank, and can therefore be corrected by an MRD code with a sufficient rank distance. Using an (n, k) bandwidth efficient MDS array code, i.e., MSR code as the inner code facilitates bandwidth efficient node repair in the event of a single node failure and allows the data collector to recover the original data from any subset of k storage nodes. In this paper, we use exactregenerating linear bandwidth efficient codes operating at the minimum storage regenerating (MSR) point [6] . However, our construction can be utilized for regenerating codes operating at any other point of repair bandwidth vs. per node storage trade-off, e.g. minimum bandwidth regenerating (MBR) point. In Section IV-B, we present coding schemes for locally repairable DSS that are resilient against static errors. These schemes are obtained by concatenating optimal rank-metric codes with MDS array codes. We also show that these schemes attain the upper bound on the resilience capacity of locally repairable DSS which is derived in Section III-B. Error-correcting codes with optimal bandwidth local regeneration are considered in Section IV-C.
We then address the problem of designing storage schemes that can tolerate attacks involving dynamic errors in Section V. Note that the setting with dynamic errors is more complicated, as it permits a single malicious node to change its pollution pattern, and introduce an arbitrarily large error both in Hamming weight and in rank. For dynamic error model, we present two solutions based on the approach employed for static error model. (We consider only the solutions for a secure regenerating code, as for a secure locally repairable code the same ideas can be applied). One solution is to exploit the inherent redundancy in the encoded data due to outer code, i.e., an MRD code, and perform error free node repair even in the presence of adversarial nodes (cf. Section V-A). This solution, a naïve method, is optimal for a specific choice of parameters. In Section V-B, we present an alternative solution which combines our concatenated coding scheme with subspace signature based cryptographic schemes to control the amount (rank) of pollution (error) introduced by an adversarial node. We employ the signature scheme by Zhao et al. [43] , which essentially reduces the dynamic error model to the one similar to a static error model, and helps us bound the rank of error introduced by an adversarial node. Following the standard cryptographic assumptions, the signature based scheme is contingent on the existence of a trusted verifier and computationally bounded adversary. Therefore, the scheme from Section V-B ensures error resilience in a restricted setting as compared to the schemes described in Section IV and Section V-A. As a result, the upper bounds derived in Section III can not be applied in this cryptographic setting.
In Section II, we start with a description of our system model and provide a brief overview of regenerating, rankmetric, locally repairable codes and codes with local regeneration. We conclude the paper by listing a set of open problems in Section VI.
C. Related Work
The problem of reliability of DSS against adversarial errors was considered in [5] , [13] , [22] , [26] , and [29] . In particular, in [26] , Pawar et al. derive upper bounds on the amount of data that can be stored on the system and reliably made available to a data collector when bandwidth optimal node repair is performed, and present coding strategies that achieve the upper bound for a particular range of system parameters, namely in the bandwidth-limited regime. In [29] , Rashmi et al. show that product-matrix based regenerating codes [28] can also tolerate adversarial errors. Here, we note that product-matrix based regenerating codes can tolerate both the static and the dynamic errors. However, the product-matrix based coding schemes have low rate at the MSR point. In [13] , Han et al. also employ the product-matrix based regenerating codes [28] to counter adversarial errors in DSS. A related but different problem of securing stored data against passive eavesdroppers is addressed in [11] , [26] , [30] , and [34] .
In [6] , Dimakis et al. establish close connections between DSS with node repairs and the network coding problem. Thus, we find it natural to apply the techniques used for error correction in network coding for DSS with node repairs. Rank-metric codes are known to be a powerful solution to the error correction problem in network coding [8] , [20] , [21] , [37] , [38] . The primary idea of this paper is to apply a similar technique, based on rank-metric codes, for error resilience in DSS.
As mentioned earlier, we propose a solution employing subspace signatures to deal with dynamic errors. Hash function based solutions have previously been presented in the context of DSS to deal with errors [5] , [26] . While promising, these hash functions based approaches provide only probabilistic guarantees for pollution containment.
II. PRELIMINARIES

A. System Model
Let M be the size of a file f over a finite field F that needs to be stored on a DSS with n nodes. Each node contains α symbols over F. A data collector reconstructs the original file f by downloading the data stored on any set of k out of n nodes. This property of a DSS is called 'any k out of n' property, and we use (n, k)-DSS to represent a storage system which has 'any k out of n' property.
B. Vector Codes
A linear [n, M, d min , α] vector code C of length n over a finite field F is defined as a linear subspace of F αn of dimension M. The symbols c i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n, of a codeword c ∈ C belong to F α , i.e., are vectors or blocks of size α. The minimum distance d min of C is defined as the minimum Hamming distance over F α . We denote by [n, M, d min , α] q a linear vector code with the additional requirement that its generator matrix is defined over the field F q ⊆ F with q elements.
Vector codes are also known as array codes. An [n, M, d min , α] array code is called MDS array code if α|M and d min = n− M α +1. (In some papers MDS array codes are denoted by [n, M α , d min ] codes over F α .) Constructions for MDS array codes can be found e.g. in [1] and [2] .
In order to store a file f ∈ F M on a DSS using a vector code C, f is first encoded to a codeword c = (c 1 , c 2 , . . . , c n ) ∈ C. Each symbol (block) c i ∈ F α of the codeword is then stored on a distinct node.
C. Regenerating Codes
Regenerating codes are a family of vectors codes for an (n, k)-DSS that allow for efficient repair of failed nodes. When a node fails, its content can be reconstructed by downloading β ≤ α symbols from each node in a set of d, k ≤ d ≤ n − 1, surviving nodes. We denote by [n, M, d min = n − k + 1, α, β, d] a linear regenerating code. Note that data can be reconstructed from any k symbols of a codeword and therefore the minimum distance is d min = n − k + 1. A trade-off between storage per node α and repair bandwidth γ dβ was established in [6] . Two classes of codes that achieve two extreme points of this trade-off are known as minimum storage regenerating (MSR) codes and minimum bandwidth regenerating (MBR) codes. The parameters (α, γ ) for MSR and MBR codes are given by M k , Md k(d−k+1) and 2Md 2kd−k 2 +k , 2Md 2kd−k 2 +k , respectively [6] . In this paper we focus on the family of linear MSR codes, namely, the [n, M = αk, d min = n − k + 1, α, β = α d−k+1 , d] codes. Note that these codes are also MDS array codes.
Let
These k blocks are encoded into n encoded blocks y i ∈ F α , 1 ≤ i ≤ n, stored on n nodes of size α, in the following way:
where y = (y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y n ) and the generator matrix G of an MSR code is an k × n block matrix over F with blocks of size α × α given by:
Note that every k × k block submatrix of G is nonsingular. For a systematic code, we have y i = x i , for 1 ≤ i ≤ k, and a parity node j , k + 1 ≤ j ≤ n, stores y j = k i=1 x i A i, j . When a node i fails, each node j in a set of d surviving nodes that are contacted to repair this node sends a vector of length β given by y j V j,i , where V j,i ∈ F α×β is a repair matrix used by node j to perform repair of node i .
1) Example of MSR Codes:
In the following, we present an example of MSR codes for DSS, which we use in Sections IV-A and IV-B to illustrate our coding schemes.
Example 1 (Zigzag Code [41] ): This class of MSR codes [41] is based on generalized permutation matrices. For an [n = 5, M = 12, d min = 3, α = 4, β = 2, d = 4] zigzag code presented in Fig. 1a , first three nodes are systematic nodes which store the data (c 1 , c 2 , . . . , c 12 ), each one α = 4 Fig. 1 . Illustration of the second node repair process in (5, 3) Zigzag code: (a) for error free system, (b) for system with erroneous information at the first storage node.
information symbols. The block generator matrix for this code is given by
where I and 0 denote the identity matrix and all-zero matrix of size 4 × 4, respectively; and Fig. 1a describes node repair process for this code. When the second node fails, the newcomer node downloads the symbols from the shaded locations at the surviving nodes.
D. Rank-Metric Codes
All the constructions of coding schemes for distributed storage systems provided in this paper are based on a family of error correcting codes in rank metric, called Gabidulin codes.
Let F q be a finite field with q elements and let F q m be an extension field of F q . Since F q m can be also considered as an m-dimensional vector space over F q , any element γ ∈ F q m can be represented as the vector
is a linear block code over F q m of length N, dimension K and minimum rank distance D. A rank-metric code that attains the Singleton bound D ≤ N − K +1 for the rank metric is called a maximum rank distance (MRD) code [4] , [9] , [32] . For m ≥ N, a construction of MRD codes was presented by Gabidulin [9] . Similar to Reed-Solomon codes, Gabidulin codes can be obtained by evaluation of polynomials; however, for Gabidulin codes, a special family of polynomials called linearized polynomials is used.
Remark 1: Note, that evaluation of a linearized polynomial is an F q -linear transformation from F q m to itself, i.e., for any a, b ∈ F q and γ 1 ,
is a linearized polynomial over F q m of q-degree at most K − 1 with K message symbols as its coefficients, and the evaluation points g 1 , . . . , g N ∈ F q m are linearly independent over F q [9] . In the rest of this paper we will consider Gabidulin codes over F q N , (m = N), i.e., the smallest possible field for the MRD codes of length N.
1) Rank Errors and Rank Erasures Correction:
Let C Gab ⊆ F N q N be a Gabidulin code with the minimum distance D. Let c ∈ C Gab be the transmitted codeword and let r = c + e total be the received word. The code C Gab can correct any vector error of the form e total = e error + e erasure = (e 1 u 1 + . . .
as long as 2t + s ≤ D − 1. The first part e error is called a rank error of rank t, where e i ∈ F q N are linearly independent over the base field F q , unknown to the decoder, and u i ∈ F N q are linearly independent vectors of length N, unknown to the decoder. The second part e erasure is called a rank erasure, where r i ∈ F q N are linearly independent over the base field F q , unknown to the decoder, and v i ∈ F N q are linearly independent vectors of length N, and known to the decoder. (In this paper we are interested only in rank column erasures, so the rank row erasures are not considered). Gabidulin [9] and Silva and Kschischang [39] present decoding algorithms for rank-metric codes.
Note that an [N, K , D] MRD code is in particular an MDS code over F q N , and then can correct erasures of any D − 1 symbols in a codeword. Such symbols erasures are in particular column erasures, when the codeword is considered in the matrix representation.
E. Locally Repairable Codes
Locally repairable codes (LRCs) are a family of codes for DSS that allow to reduce the number of nodes participating in the node repair process. LRCs are defined as follows.
We say that an [n,
where C| (i) denotes the puncturing of C on the set [n]\ (i ) of coordinates. Note that the last two properties imply that each element j ∈ (i ) can be written as a function of a set of at most r elements in (i ) (not containing j ).
It was proved in [17] and [30] that the minimum distance of an (r, δ, α) LRC of length n and dimension M satisfies
We say that an (r, δ, α) LRC for an (n, n − d min + 1)-DSS is optimal if its minimum distance d min attains the bound (2) . In this paper we consider the construction of optimal (r, δ, α) LRCs from [36] (for α = 1) and its generalization from [30] . This construction is based on concatenation of Gabidulin codes and MDS array codes: a file f over F = F q N of size M ≥ r α is first encoded using an [N, M, D] Gabidulin code over F. The codeword of the Gabidulin code is then partitioned into local disjoint groups, each of size r α, and each local group is then encoded using an [(r +δ −1), r α, δ, α] q MDS array code with the generator matrix defined over F q ⊆ F. (If r α N, there is a group of size r α < r α, which is then encoded by using an [(r + δ − 1), r α, δ, α] q MDS array code). A code obtained by this construction is optimal if (r + δ − 1)|n, N = nrα r+δ−1 and q ≥ (r + δ − 1). For a case when (r + δ − 1) n, see the details in [30] .
1) Example of Optimal LRC: The following example of optimal LRC will be used further for illustration of our errorcorrecting coding scheme.
Example 2: We consider a DSS with the following parameters: [36, 28, 9] Gabidulin code C Gab , which is obtained by encoding M = 28 symbols over F of the original file. The Gabidulin codeword is then partitioned into three groups (a 1 , . . . , a 12 ), (b 1 , . . . , b 12 ), and (c 1 , . . . , c 12 ). Encoded symbols in each group are stored on three storage nodes as shown in Fig. 2 . In the second stage of encoding, a [5, 3 · 4, 3, 4] q MDS array code is applied on each local group to obtain δ − 1 = 2 parity nodes per local group. The coding scheme is illustrated in Fig. 2 .
By (2) we have d min (C loc ) ≤ 5. One can check that every 4 nodes failures (which is equivalent to at most 8 rank erasures [30] ) can be corrected by this code, and thus it has minimum distance 5. In addition, when a single node fails, it can be repaired by using the data stored on any three other nodes from the same group.
F. LRCs With Local Regeneration
LRCs with local regeneration are the hybrid codes which for the given locality parameters minimize the repair bandwidth. These codes, as proposed in [17] and [30] , are obtained by combining locally repairable codes with regenerating codes. In a node repair process for an original LRC, a newcomer node contacts r nodes in its local group and downloads all the data stored on these nodes. In order to reduce repair bandwidth of LRCs, regenerating codes are applied in local groups to obtain the hybrid codes. This allows a newcomer node to contact any d ≥ r intact nodes in its local group and download only β ≤ α symbols stored on each of these nodes during a node repair process.
When an [r + δ − 1, r α, δ, α, β, d] q MSR code is applied in each local group instead of an MDS array code in the second step of construction of LRC presented in Subsection II-E, then the resulting code, denoted by (r, δ, α, β, d) MSR-LRC, has the maximal minimum distance (since an MSR code is also an MDS array code), the local minimum storage per node, and the minimized repair bandwidth. (The details of this construction and its properties can be found in [30] .) Also, when an MBR code is applied in each local group instead of an MDS array code in the second step of construction of LRC presented in subsection II-E, then the resulting code, denoted by (r, δ, α, β, d) MBR-LRC, has the maximal possible minimum distance, and the local minimum repair bandwidth. (The details of this construction and its properties can be found in [18] .) Example 3: Consider the optimal LRC from Example 2. Now in the second stage of encoding we apply the MSR code (zigzag code) from Example 1. The obtained code is an optimal MSR-LRC [30] .
III. UPPER BOUNDS ON RESILIENCE CAPACITY
In this section we study error resilience of DSS which employ different kinds of codes. In particular, we focus on obtaining upper bounds on the resilience capacity, the amount of data that can be stored and reliably delivered to a data collector in the presence of adversarial nodes, of coded DSS. In [26] , Pawat et al. obtain such upper bounds for DSS employing regenerating codes. For the shake of completeness, we first state their result here as we use the result in the subsequent sections. Next, we focus on the resilience capacity for locally repairable codes (LRCs) and LRCs with local regeneration. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work which studies the problem of error resilience in the context of LRCs and LRCs with local regeneration. Moreover, we note that the bounds presented here are applicable to adversaries involving both static and dynamic errors.
A. Resilience Capacity for Regenerating Codes
The upper bound on the amount of data that can be stored reliably on an (n, k)-DSS with at most t < k 2 corrupted nodes which employs an [n, M, n −k +1, α, β, d] regenerating code, was presented by Pawar et al. [26] . This amount of data is called resilience capacity and denoted by C t (α, β, d) . The bound on the resilience capacity is given by
Remark 2: Although the static error model is less general than the model considered in [26] , the upper bound in (3) applies to the static model as well. Pawar et al. [26] obtain the upper bound in (3) by evaluating a cut of the information flow graph corresponding to a particular node failure sequence, pattern of nodes under adversarial attack and data collector. This information flow graph is also valid in the context of the static error model. Consequently, its cut which provides an upper bound on the information flow and represents the amount of data that can be reliably stored on DSS is applicable to the static error model as well. As shown in this paper, this bound is tight for static model at the MSR point, which might not be the case for the general error model considered in [26] .
B. Resilience Capacity for Locally Repairable Codes
In this subsection we study DSS which employ locally repairable codes in the presence of errors. We consider only optimal LRCs, i.e., we consider an (n, n−d min +1)-DSS where d min attains the upper bound (2), similarly to the scenario with the regenerating codes, where the system which has the MDS property is considered. In the following, we derive an upper bound on the amount of data that can be reliably stored on a DSS employing an LRC which contains corrupted nodes.
We denote by C t (r, δ, α) the resilience capacity of an (n, n − d min + 1)-DSS which employs an (r, δ, α) LRC in the presence of t corrupted nodes (for any type of errors). In other words, a data collector contacting any n − d min + 1 storage nodes can reconstruct the original data of size C t (r, δ, α) stored on DSS in the presence of at most t adversarial storage nodes.
In this subsection, we restrict ourselves to those minimum distance optimal LRCs that have disjoint local groups. We note that all the known constructions of minimum distance optimal LRCs satisfy this structure. Moreover, under certain parameter settings, it is shown in [17, Th. 2.2, 4.4 ] that having disjoint local groups is necessary for a code to be minimum distance optimal.
Theorem 1: Consider an (n, n − d min + 1)-DSS which employs an (r, δ, α) LRC with disjoint local groups. If there are at most t corrupted nodes, then the upper bound on the resilience capacity is given by
where ρ = n−d min +1 r+δ−1 , h = (n − d min + 1) − ρ(r + δ − 1), and 2t < ρr + min{h, r }.
Proof: Let the LRC under consideration have g disjoint local groups. We use vector τ = (τ 1 , τ 2 , . . . , τ g ) to denote an adversarial node pattern, where τ i denotes the number of adversarial nodes in i th local group and g i=1 τ i = t. Note that during a node repair a newcomer node contacts any r out of r + δ − 2 surviving nodes in its local group and downloads all the data stored on these r nodes in order to regenerate the failed node. To obtain the upper bound, we evaluate the value of a cut in the information flow graph for this DSS. Similarly to [30] , we consider a data collector which contacts r + δ − 1 nodes from each of first ρ = n−d min +1 r+δ−1 local groups and h = (n − d min + 1) − ρ(r + δ − 1) nodes from (ρ + 1)th local group. Then we have the following cut value CUT CUT = ρr α + min{hα, r α}.
Next, we consider the adversarial node pattern τ = (τ 1 = r,
. We further assume that in each local group we have repaired r + δ − 1 − r = δ − 1 nodes by contacting remaining r nodes and adversarial nodes always belong to nonrepaired nodes. Further, we divide the independent symbols contributing to the value of CUT into three groups: 1) M 1 : tα symbols corresponding to t adversarial nodes.
2) M 2 : tα symbols from t intact nodes.
3) M 3 : CUT − 2tα remaining symbols after excluding M 1 and M 2 from CUT. Next, we use an argument similar to that used in [26, Appendix B] . Let M 1 (f), M 2 (f) and M 3 (f) are the symbols corresponding to the aforementioned three groups when the file stored on the system is f and adversary does not introduce any errors. As argued in [26, Appendix B] , it can be shown that in order to be able to distinguish between two distinct files f 1 and f 2 at the data collector, it is a necessary condition that M 3 (f 1 ) = M 3 (f 2 ). Assume that this is not the case and we have M 3 (f 1 ) = M 3 (f 2 ). Assume that f 1 is the true message. But adversarial nodes can transmit M 1 (f 2 ) to the data collector. Now, the data collector can not distinguish between two equally likely messages (files) f 1 and f 2 given
This gives us the following bound on the resilience capacity:
C. Resilience Capacity for LRCs With Local Regeneration
In this subsection, we discuss the error resilience of the hybrid codes which for a given locality parameters minimize the repair bandwidth (see Subsection II-F). In particular, we provide an upper bound on the resilience capacity for MSR-LRC and for MBR-LRC. We denote by C t (r, δ, α, β, d) MSR (C t (r, δ, α, β, d) MBR ) the resilience capacity of an (n, n − d min + 1)-DSS which employs an (r, δ, α, β, d) MSR-LRC (MBR-LRC) in the presence of t corrupted nodes.
Theorem 2: Consider an (n, n − d min + 1)-DSS which employs an (r, δ, α, β, d) MSR-LRC (MBR-LRC), for r + δ − 1 > d > r . If there are at most t corrupted nodes, then the upper bound on the resilience capacity of MSR-LRC is given by
and the resilience capacity for the MBR-LRC is upper bounded by
2 β andρ, s,s, andŝ are such thatρs + (ρ −ρ)s +ŝ = t, 2 max{s,s} ≤ d, and 2ŝ ≤ h.
Proof (MSR-LRC): Similarly to the proof of Theorem 1, we evaluate the value of a cut in the corresponding information flow graph. We again consider a data collector that contacts r + δ − 1 nodes from each of first ρ local groups and h nodes from (ρ + 1)th local group. We further assume that the pattern of adversarial nodes is τ =
. In each group, we assume that all but d nodes have been repaired at least once. The remaining d nodes are used to repair all node failures. The corrupted nodes are assumed to be among these d nodes in their local groups. The cut value for the information flow graph associated with this scenario is given by
Similar to the proof of Theorem 1, we divide the independent symbols in CUT MSR into three groups: 1) M 1 : t d r α + min{γ , r }α symbols corresponding to t adversarial nodes. Again following the argument similar to that for LRCs, we get the following bound on the resilience capacity for an MSR-LRC:
Note that if t < r then this bound is the same as the bound (4) for LRCs. MBR-LRC: If we consider the same adversarial node pattern as in case MSR-LRC, we get the following bound on the resilience capacity for an MBR-LRC:
Alternatively, we consider another pattern of eavesdropped nodes τ = (τ 1 = s, τ 2 = s, . . . , τρ = s, τρ +1 =s, τ ρ =s, τ ρ+1 =ŝ, τ ρ+2 = 0, . . . , τ g = 0). Here,ρ, s,s, andŝ are such thatρs + (ρ −ρ)s +ŝ = t, 2 max{s,s} ≤ d, and 2ŝ ≤ min{h, r }. Note that such choice is always possible given the particular choice of data collector and the assumption that 2t < ρr + min{h, r }. For this pattern of adversarial node, we obtain the following upper bound on the resilience capacity for an MBR-LRC:
Now, we can take minimum of RHS of (7) and (8) to complete the proof.
IV. CODING SCHEMES FOR STATIC ERROR MODEL
In this section we provide coding schemes for the static error model. First, we present a scheme which allows DSS employing MSR codes to reliably store information in the presence of t corrupted nodes under static error model. We then present a coding scheme for DSS which employs optimal LRCs. We illustrate main ideas behind the proposed schemes by using examples from Section II-C1 and Section II-E1. We also prove that these coding schemes are optimal under the static error model. Finally, we briefly comment on error resilience in LRCs with local regeneration.
A. Construction of Error-Correcting MSR Codes
In this subsection we present a concatenated coding scheme which is based on a Gabidulin code as an outer code and an MSR code as an inner code. We will prove in the sequel that if the outer Gabidulin code has minimum distance at least 2tα + 1, where α is a storage in each node, then the code obtained by this scheme is a t-error-correcting MSR code. We encode the file in two steps before storing it on an (n, k)-DSS as follows.
1) First, the file is encoded using an [N, M, D = N − M + 1] Gabidulin code C Gab over F, with N evaluation points g 1 , . . . , g N from F, which are linearly independent over F q , as described in Section II-D. 2) Second, the codeword c f = ( f (g 1 ), . . . , f (g N )) ∈ C Gab that corresponds to the file f is encoded using an [n, N, d min , α, β, d] q MSR (systematic) code C MSR , where d min = n − k + 1, and β = α d−k+1 , as described in Section II-C: the codeword c f is partitioned into k blocks of size α, which are encoded into n blocks of size α (over F) and then stored on n system nodes. The proposed coding scheme for an error-correcting MSR code is illustrated in Fig. 3 .
Note, that we use the MSR code C MSR with the generator matrix defined over F q ⊆ F, and during the process of node repair, a set of surviving nodes transmits linear combinations of the stored elements with the coefficients from F q .
The following lemma is useful to show the properties of the constructed code. Proof: Let g 1 , . . . , g N be the evaluation points of the Gabidulin code C Gab used in the construction. Consider a set S = {i 1 , . . . i k } of nodes. The content of these nodes is given by c f G S , where G S = (a i, j ) αk i, j =1 is a αk × αk submatrix of the generator matrix G of C MSR which corresponds to the nodes in S, i.e., which consists of columns {(i j − 1)α + 1, . . . , i j α} k j =1 . The j th coordinate of the vector c f G S of length αk is given by (c f G S ) j = ( f (g 1 ), . . . , f (g αk ))(a 1, j , . . . , a αk, where (a 1, j , . . . , a αk, j ) T is the j th column of G S and the last equality follows from the F q -linearity of f (x). Now consider the vector of the new evaluation points of f :
Note that since C MSR is an MDS array code, then G S is a full rank matrix over F q . Therefore, { g 1 , . . . g αk } are linearly independent over F q if and only if {g 1 , . . . , g αk } are linearly independent over F q . Therefore, the observations c f G S are essentially evaluations of linearized polynomial at kα linearly independent points over F q from F, which correspond to a codeword of an [N = αk, M, D = N − M + 1] Gabidulin code C Gab . Note that C Gab has the same parameters as C Gab , however, the evaluation points of these two codes are different.
The following theorem shows that if 2tα + 1 ≤ D, then the proposed scheme tolerates up to t erroneous nodes, i.e., from any k nodes a data collector can retrieve the original data even in presence of an adversary which controls (modifies) t nodes. Note that the node repairs are performed exactly in the same way as in an error-free DSS.
Theorem 4: Let t be the number of erroneous nodes in the system based on concatenation of Gabidulin and MSR codes from Construction I. If 2tα + 1 ≤ D, then the original data can be recovered from any k nodes.
Proof: Let c f ∈ F be the codeword in C Gab which corresponds to the file f. Let (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x k ), x i ∈ F α , be the partition of c f into k blocks of size α each. We use (y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y n ), y i ∈ F α to denote n encoded blocks (stored on n nodes) that are obtained by encoding k blocks (x 1 , . . . , x k ) to a codeword in C MSR . Let S = {i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i t } be the set of indices of the erroneous nodes. Hence the i j th node, i j ∈ S, contains k =1 x A ,i j + e i j , where e i j = (e i j 1 , e i j 2 , . . . , e i j α ) ∈ F α denotes an adversarial error introduced by the i j th node, and A ,i j ∈ F α×α q are the blocks of the generator matrix of C MSR . When the failed nodes are being repaired, the errors from adversarial nodes propagate to the repaired nodes. In particular, th node, 1 ≤ ≤ n,
represents the propagation of error e i j and depends on the specific choice of an MSR code. Suppose a data collector contacts k nodes indexed by D ⊂ [n] and downloads k j =1 x j A j,i + t j =1 e i j B i j i from node i ∈ D.
• Case 1. If these k nodes are all systematic nodes, then we obtain (x 1 , x 2 , . . . ,
is the blocks matrix with the ( j, )th block of B is given by B i j , 1 ≤ ≤ k, 1 ≤ j ≤ t, and e = (e i 1 , e i 2 , . . . , e i t ) ∈ F αt . • Case 2. If not all the k nodes are systematic, we obtain c f + e B, where the ( j, )th block of the blocks matrix B ∈ F αt ×αk q is given by B i j , ∈ D, 1 ≤ j ≤ t, e is defined as previously, and c f is the codeword of the Gabidulin code C Gab with the same parameters as C Gab , according to Lemma 3.
In any case, since rank(e) ≤ tα over F q , and D ≥ 2tα + 1, a Gabidulin code can correct this error; consequently, by applying erasure decoding of the inner MSR code, which is in particular an MDS array code (for Case 2), the file f can be recovered. Now we illustrate the idea of the construction with the help of the example of the MSR code for an (5, 3)-DSS, presented in Section II-C1. We consider the case where an adversary pollutes the information stored on a single storage node and demonstrate that the rank of the error introduced by the adversary does not increase due to node repair dynamics under the static error model. Hence, a data collector can recover the correct original information using decoders for an MRD code C Gab and MSR code C MSR .
Example 4: Let C Gab be an [12, 4, 9] Gabidulin code over F = F q 12 and let t = 1. Let C MSR be the [5, 12, 3, 4, 2, 4] 
Then we encode c f again by using C MSR . The first three systematic nodes of (5, 3)-DSS store a codeword c f , i.e., the content stored on i th systematic node, 1 ≤ i ≤ 3, is y i = (c 4(i−1)+1 , . . . , c 4i ) ∈ F 4 . Let us assume that an adversary attacks the first storage node and introduces erroneous information. The erroneous information at the first node can be modeled as y 1 e 2 , e 3 , e 4 ) . Now assume that the second node fails. The system is oblivious to the presence of pollution at the first node, and employs an exact regeneration strategy to reconstruct the second node. The reconstructed node downloads the symbols from the shaded locations at the surviving nodes, as described in Fig. 1b , and solves a linear system of equations to obtain (c 5 , c 6 , c 7 , c 8 ) + (−e 1 , −e 2 , −2 −1 e 1 , −2 −1 e 2 ), where 2 −1 denotes the inverse element of 2 in F q , q ≥ 3.
• Case 1: First assume that a data collector accesses the first three (systematic) nodes to recover the original data. The data collector now has c = c f + e[I, B 1 2 , 0], where I and 0 are 4 × 4 identity and zeroes matrices, respectively. Note that
• Case 2: Assume that a data collector accesses the first, second, and the fourth nodes to recover the original data. In this case, the data collector has c = c f + e[I, B 1 2 , 0], where I , 0, and B 1 2 are defined as previously, and c f = (c 1 , c 2 , . . . , c 8 , c 1 + c 5 + c 9 , c 2 + c 6 + c 10 , c 3 + c 7 + c 11 , c 4 + c 8 + c 12 ) is a codeword of a [12, 4, 9] Gabidulin code C Gab with evaluation points {g 1 , g 2 , . . . , g 8 , g 1 + g 5 + g 9 , g 2 + g 6 + g 10 , g 3 + g 7 + g 11 , g 4 + g 8 + g 12 }.
In any case, c contains an error of rank at most 4. Since the minimum rank distance of codes C Gab and C Gab is 9, the codeword c ∈ C Gab (for Case 1) and the codeword c ∈ C Gab (for Case 2) can be correctly decoded. Now, this allows the original information f to be recovered by (1) (and by applying the erasure decoding of C MSR in Case 2). 1) Optimality of Construction I: Here, we show that our concatenated scheme is optimal in the presence of static errors as it attains the upper bound (3) on the resilience capacity. Note that for an [n, M, d min , α, β, d] MSR code it holds that β = α d−k+1 and hence the upper bound (3) on the resilience capacity can be rewritten as
Let the set of parameters {M, n, k, α, β, d, N, D} be as described in Construction I. Then N = M + D − 1 and N = αk. Let t be an integer such that D = 2tα + 1. Then αk = M+ D−1 = M+2tα, and hence M = α(k−2t). Thus, our concatenated coding scheme achieves the bound in (10) .
Remark 3: The authors in [26] provided an explicit construction of codes that attain the bound in (10) for bandwidth-limited regime. However, this construction has practical limitations for large values of t since the decoding algorithm presented in [26] is exponential in t. On the other hand, the decoding for the construction presented in our paper is efficient as it is based on two efficient decoding algorithms: one for an MSR code, and another one for a Gabidulin code. However, our coding scheme provides resilience for a weaker model of adversarial errors.
Remark 4: In [29] , Rashmi et al. consider a scenario, referred as 'erasure', where some nodes which are supposed to provide data during node repair become unavailable. It is easy to see from (1) that our construction can also correct such erasures, as long as the minimum distance of the MRD code used as an outer code is large enough. The codes obtained by our construction also attain the bound on the capacity derived in [29] . Here, we note that while our construction works with any MSR code and in particular with an MSR code with high rate, it provides a solution for a restricted error model, i.e., static errors.
B. Construction of Error-Correcting LRCs
In this subsection we present a concatenated coding scheme, also based on a Gabidulin and MDS array codes, for errorcorrecting locally repairable codes and prove the optimality of this construction for static errors model.
Construction II: Let n, d min , r, δ, α be the given parameters. ( f (g 1 ), . . . , f (g N ) ) be the codeword of C Gab that corresponds to the file f, where g 1 , . . . , g N ∈ F are evaluation points for the Gabidulin code, which are linearly independent over F q . This codeword is partitioned into local disjoint groups, each one of size r α and then each local group is encoded using an [(r + δ − 1), r α, δ, α] q MDS array code. This coding scheme is illustrated in Fig. 4 .
The following theorem shows the error resilience of the proposed code. Note, that the node repairs of this scheme are performed exactly in the same (local) way as in an error-free LRC.
Theorem 5: Let t be the number of erroneous nodes in the system which employs a d min -optimal LRC based on concatenation of Gabidulin and MDS array codes, from Construction II. If the minimum distance D of the underlying
r α − min{hα, r α} + 1, then the original data can be recovered from any n − d min + 1 nodes. Proof: We consider the worst case data collector which contacts n − d min + 1 nodes which belong to ρ (or ρ + 1) different groups, (r + δ − 1)|(n − d min + 1) (or (r + δ − 1) (n − d min + 1)), which contain all the corrupted nodes. During the node repairs, an error spreads to at most all the nodes which belong to the same local group that contains an erroneous node. Based on Lemma 3 the data collector obtains n−d min +1 r+δ−1 r α + min{hα, r α} symbols of the corresponding Gabidulin code, which can contain an error of rank at most tα, similarly to the proof of Theorem 4. Therefore, this corresponds to tα rank errors and N − n−d min +1 r+δ−1 r α−min{hα, r α} rank erasures. Thus the statement of the theorem follows from the fact that N = n r+δ−1 r α. Next, we will show that our error-correcting LRC attains the upper bound on the resilience capacity of Theorem 1, for a static errors model. Corollary 1: Let C LRC be the LRC for (n, n − d min + 1)-DSS obtained from Construction II and let t be the number of corrupted nodes, where 2t < ρr + min{h, r }, for ρ and h defined in Theorem 1. If the corresponding Gabidulin code has the minimum distance D = 2tα + ( n r+δ−1 − ρ)r α − min{hα, r α} + 1 then C LRC attains the bound (4) on the resilience capacity.
Proof: We need to prove that M = (ρr − 2t) α + min{hα, r α}. Since the corresponding [N, M , D] Gabidulin code is an MRD code, it holds that M = N − D + 1. Then
Now we illustrate the key ideas involved in the Construction II with the help of an example. In the following example, we consider the case where an adversary pollutes the information stored on a single storage node.
Example 5: Consider the code of Example 2 with additional parameters t = 1 and M = 20. The Gabidulin code used in the first step of the encoding is the [36, 20, 17] code C Gab over F = F q 36 and the MDS array code over F q used in the second step of the construction is the (5, 3) zigzag code from Example 1. Here we have ρ = 2 and h = 1. In other words, the system stores a file f of size 20 over F, and a data collector should reconstruct this file from any n − d min + 1 = 15 − 5 + 1 = 11 nodes. Let us assume that an adversary attacks the third storage node and introduces erroneous information. The erroneous information at the third node is modeled as (a 9 , a 10 , a 11 , a 12 ) + (e 1 , e 2 , e 3 , e 4 ). Now assume that the second node fails. The system is oblivious to the presence of pollution at the third node, and employs the erasure decoding of the [5, 3 · 4, 3, 4] q MDS array code to reconstruct the second node: Assume that the reconstructed node downloads all the symbols from the first, the third and the fifth nodes and solves a linear system of equations to obtain (a 5 , a 6 , a 7 , a 8 ) + (−e 4 , −2e 3 , −e 2 , −2 −1 e 1 ), where 2 −1 denotes the inverse element of 2 in F q , q ≥ 3.
Assume that a data collector contacts 11 first nodes (ρ = 2 full groups, 5 nodes in each one, and h = 1 node in the additional group). He obtains 12 + 12 + 4 symbols corresponding to the Gabidulin codeword c f (which is of length 36), where these 28 symbols contain an error of rank at most 4:
where I m denotes the identity matrix of order m, 0 a×b denotes a × b matrix with all of its entries equal to zero, and B 2 is defined as follows:
In other words, we have 8 erasures in the Gabidulin codeword and at most 4 rank errors. Since the distance of C Gab is D = 17, by (1) the original data is recovered by applying errors and erasures correction of the Gabidulin code. (Note that (e 1 , e 2 , e 3 , e 4 ), [0, B 2 , I, 0 4×24 ], (c 5 , . . . , c 12 ) are unknown to the decoder but [0 8×28 , −I 8 ] is known to the decoder).
C. Construction of Error-Correcting LRCs With Local Regeneration
Similarly to the construction of error-correcting LRCs, where the only difference to the construction of d min -optimal LRC (without error correction) is the larger minimum rank distance of the corresponding Gabidulin code, the construction for error-correcting LRCs with local regeneration is based on the construction of an error-free MSR-LRC (MBR-LRC), where the Gabidulin code is chosen with larger minimum distance. We note that since for the case t < r the bounds for LRCs and MSR-LRCs are identical, the optimal codes can be obtained simply by replacement of MDS array codes by MSR codes in Construction II. However, constructions for optimal error-correcting MSR-LRCs for general cases and also for optimal error-correcting MBR-LRC codes still remain an open problem.
V. DYNAMIC ERROR MODEL
In this section, we consider the problem of designing coding schemes for DSS that work under dynamic error model. Note, that in a static error model each time an attacked node is requested for the data to be sent, it sends some linear combinations of the data that has been modified on it by an adversary, which the adversary is allowed to do only once. Therefore, the rank of the error that a single node under static attack causes throughout the operation of DSS is bounded above by α. This is not the case under the dynamic error model as a single attacked node can inject an error of large rank if it is utilized in multiple node repairs, which may render the data stored on DSS useless.
Towards this model, some results are presented in [26] and [29] . The coding scheme proposed in [26] does not have an efficient decoding during the data reconstruction process and it works specifically with bandwidth efficiently repairable codes at the MBR point. The coding scheme of [29] deals with the dynamic error model at the MSR point, but there scheme works only for low rate, i.e., 2k ≤ n + 1.
Next, we present two solutions to deal with attack under the dynamic error model. The first solution aims to correct errors during the node repair process. The second approach is based on existing literature on subspace signatures. All the results presented in this section are given for MSR codes. Since our locally repairable codes make use of MDS array codes (or MSR codes for codes with local regeneration) in each local group, the similar ideas can be applied for this family of DSS codes as well.
A. Naïve Scheme for Dynamic Error Model
A solution for the dynamic error model is to adopt a repair scheme where a newcomer node utilizes the redundancy in the downloaded data to perform error-free exact repair even in the presence of errors in the downloaded data. Next, we analyze the maximum amount of information that can be stored on the DSS employing concatenated codes proposed in Section IV-A under the dynamic error model, if an error free node repair is performed.
When a storage node fails, a newcomer node downloads dβ symbols from any d surviving nodes (d ≥ k) (for MSR code dβ = α + (k − 1)β). Since there can be at most t adversarial nodes present in the system, the newcomer node receives at most tβ erroneous symbols. Therefore, out of N = kα symbols of a Gabidulin codeword, by Lemma 3, the newcomer has (k − 1)β + α symbols (using the fact that the inner code is an MDS code and we perform bandwidth efficient repair). All the other kα−(k−1)β−α = (α−β)(k−1) symbols of a Gabidulin codeword can be considered as the erased symbols. Let M denote the number of information symbols (over F = F q N ) that are stored on the DSS. Then the minimum distance D of the corresponding Gabidulin code satisfies D = kα − M + 1. Therefore we can reconstruct the entire Gabidulin codeword and thus the data stored on the failed node, if we have
This gives us
Note that the bound in (3) is still applicable. For k = 2t + 1, the right hand side expression in (11) is equal to that in (3). Therefore, this naïve repair scheme is optimal in terms of the capacity of DSS even in the dynamic error model. However, the difference between these bounds is monotonically increasing with (k − 2t − 1) and the solution proposed in this section is suboptimal for general values of system parameters k and t. Remark 5: In a similar way, it can shown that the LRCs based construction presented in Section IV-B is optimal under dynamic error model when ρr + min{h, r } = 2t + 1.
B. Subspace Signatures Approach
As mentioned previously, in the dynamic error model an attacked node can inject a high rank error. Thus, it is desirable to restrict the rank of the aggregate error that a particular attacked node can cause in the entire system under dynamic error model. In this subsection, we propose to combine the existing literature on detecting subspace pollution with MRD codes to counter a dynamic attack. In this subsection, we illustrate this with the help of subspace signatures proposed in [43] . For this approach, we work with the standard cryptographic assumption that the adversary is computationally bounded. Note that the computationally bounded adversary has full knowledge of the coding scheme and can observe all nodes. We refer to this adversary model as a computationally bounded omniscient adversary.
Due to various cryptographic assumptions, the resilience guarantees presented in this subsection are weaker than those established in the rest of the paper. Moreover, the information theoretic bounds from Section III can not be applied to this setting. However, while the problem of designing dynamic error resilient schemes for general sets of parameters remains open, we propose a simple and practical scheme which can tolerate dynamic errors if the required assumptions hold.
Let us consider an n-nodes DSS that employs a Gabidulin and an MSR code based storage scheme as explained in Section IV-A. For node i , content stored on it, i.e. y i ∈ F α = F α q N , can be viewed as an N ×α matrix over F q . These α column vectors of length N stored on i th node span a subspace (column space of y i when viewed as a matrix over F q ) in F N q of dimension at most α. Since all elements of the coding matrix and repair matrices are from F q , during node repair process node i sends β vectors that lie in the subspace spanned by y i . If we make sure that even under the dynamic error model an attacked node sends vectors from the same α-dimensional subspace of F N q during node repairs and data reconstruction, a data collector encounters at most tα-rank error, which can be corrected with a Gabidulin code of large enough distance as in the static model. Subspace signatures solve this problem of enforcing the requirement that a node sends data (vectors) from the same α-dimensional subspace of F N q . We assume existence of a trusted verifier, who stores all n subspace signatures, one signature for each storage node, generated according to the procedure explained in [43] . Whenever a particular node sends data during a node repair or data reconstruction, the truster verifier checks the data against the stored subspace signature corresponding to that particular storage node.
Remark 6: Here, we note that there is some storage overhead associated with trusted verifier as it stores subspace signatures. The signature verification process adds to the computational complexity as well. Moreover, as it becomes clear below, the solution presented here is suitable to organized settings, e.g., data centers, where a node declared to be erroneous by the verifier can be replaced by a new storage node.
For the purpose of the data reconstruction, whenever a node does not pass the signature test, this node is considered as α rank erasures. If s ≤ t nodes fail the test during data reconstruction, the data collector deals with sα rank erasures and (t − s)α rank errors. Given that the outer Gabidulin code has minimum rank distance 2tα + 1 ≥ 2(t − s)α + sα + 1, the original data can be reconstructed without an error.
Next, we argue how subspace signatures help restrict rank of the error introduced in the system during a node repair process. Assume that node i fails. Let R i ⊆ {1, . . . , n}\{i } denote the set of d surviving nodes that are contacted to repair node i . In order to repair node i , each node j ∈ R i is supposed to send y j V j i , where V j i is an α × β repair matrix of node i associated with node j . Since the data downloaded through all the surviving nodes is verified against subspace signatures, data from node j passes the test if it is of the form y j V j i , where y j V j i is in the column space of y j and V j i may be different from V j i .
If any of the surviving (helper) nodes does not pass the test, the trusted verifier begins the naïve repair for the failed node and the nodes that fail the test. During this naïve repair, entire data is downloaded from a set of k −s nodes out of d −s nodes that provide data for node repair and pass the subspace test. Here, s is the number of nodes that fail the subspace test. Note that each node of these k−s selected nodes provides additional α − β symbols as it has already sent β symbols (over F N q ). The decoding algorithm for Gabidulin codes is run on (k − s)α symbols downloaded from this selected set of k − s nodes. There can be at most t − s adversary nodes present in the selected set of k − s nodes (s adversarial nodes that failed the subspace test are excluded from this process), which can contribute at most (t − s)α erroneous symbols. Since the distance of the Gabidulin code is greater than 2(t − s)α + sα + 1, the decoding algorithm recovers the original file, which is used to get the data stored on nodes being repaired.
In case when all the adversarial nodes pass the test, the data provided by each node j ∈ R i is of the form y j V j i = y j V j i + y j ( V j i − V j i ).
After performing exact repair process for node i , node i stores y i + y e B i , where B i is an tα × α matrix over F q and y e = [y i 1 , . . . , y i t ] ∈ F t α . Here {i 1 , . . . , i t } denotes the set of t adversarial nodes. After the node repair, the trusted verifier generates a new subspace signature corresponding to the data stored on a node i for future verification. At any point of time, the data stored on DSS can be represented as y = y + y e B,
where columns with indices from {(i − 1)α + 1, . . . , tα} of B are equal to α columns of B i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n. It is evident from (12) that the rank of the aggregate error in the system is at most tα and a Gabidulin code with large enough distance can ensure the reliable recovery of the original data. Remark 7: One may apply the signature based approach presented in this subsection to other adversary models which are weaker than the general dynamic model, for example, the static model or a limited knowledge adversary from [26] . However, we believe that while this approach is simple and practical, presenting a cryptographic scheme for the static error model may complicate a setting which is already solved (see Section IV) under a much cleaner model without too many assumptions.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH
A novel concatenated coding scheme for DSS is presented. The scheme makes use of rank-metric codes, in particular, Gabidulin codes, as the first step of the process of encoding the data. In the second step of the encoding process, MDS optimal repair array codes (locally or globally) are used. This construction ensures resilience against static adversarial errors. A modification of the scheme based on subspace signatures enables resilience against dynamic errors. Also, upper bounds on the resilience capacity for LRCs, MSR-LRCs, and MBR-LRCs are presented.
We conclude with a list of open problems for future research.
1) Do there exist (explicit) high-rate error-correcting MSR codes which attain the upper bound (3) on the resilience capacity for a general (dynamic) error model? or is it possible to improve the upper bound under dynamic error model for certain values of system parameters? 2) Is it possible to improve the bounds on resilience capacity for MSR-LRCs and MBR-LRCs?
3) Do there exist (explicit) optimal MSR-LRCs and MBR-LRCs for a general set of parameters?
